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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
OGDEN CITY, a niunicipal 
Corporation, 
vs 
CLYDE C. PATTERSON, 
Plaintiff and 
A ppella;nt, 
Defenda.nt and 
Respondent 
STATE1MENT OF FACTS 
This action was brought by the Appellant Ogden 
City seeking a declaratory judgment declaring, first, 
that no office foi a second judge of the Ogden City Court 
and ex-officio justice of the peace presently exists under 
Chapter 26, Laws of Utah, 1951, and, second, that even 
if such office exists the defendant is not legally elected 
thereto and entitled to hold the office and receive the 
emoluments. 
Appellant appeals from an adverse judgment on 
both issues. 
There is, we believe, no dispute on the facts. They 
are set out in the Findings of Fact as amended. (R 013 
to 021). 
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The defendant is an attorney possessing all quali-
fications to entitle him to aspire to office as a judge of 
the City Court of Ogden City. (R 013.) 
The population of Ogden City as determined by 
the official United States Census for 1940 was, at the 
date of that census, 43,688. (R 014.) 
On April 2, 1950, the U. S. Bureau of the Census, 
pursuant to Federal law to take the 1950 census, includ-
ing an official census of Ogden City. In accord with 
Federal law the returns reflecting the count of the popu-
lation of Ogden City were forwarded to the District 
Supervisor, and the enumeration was in due course 
forwarded to the Director of the Census at Washington. 
(R 014.) 
Under Federal law the enumeration was taken as 
of April 1st, and returns sent to the supervisor within 
30 days of April 2nd. (13 U. S. C. A. 206). The tabu-
lation of total population by states was required to be 
completed by December 2, 1950. (13 U. S. C. A. 202). 
On or about June 14, 1950, the District Supervisor 
of the Census at Ogden by letter addressed to the Mayor 
of Ogden, in form illustrated by Exhibit C, advised the 
Mayor that a preliminary count showed Ogden's popu-
lation as of April 1, 1950, at 56,908. (R 030-031.) 
On August 25, 1950, the Director of the Census, 
pursuant to the provisions of 13 U. S. C. A. 4 and 213, 
issued a preliminary bulletin and report announcing, 
subject to later revision, the result of a preliminary 
count of the Census returns of the population of Ogden 
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and other places in Utah. That. bulletin 8tated that the 
population of Ogden on April1, 1950, was 56,910. (R 014, 
Exhibit B.) 
On March 8, 1951, the Legislature passed the Bill 
appearing· as Chapter 26, Laws of Utah, 1951, which 
became effertiYe ~fay 8,1951. By Section 104-4-2 of the 
Judicial Code, as amended by that law, it is provided 
that at the 1951 ~Iunicipal Election and thereafter city 
judges shall be elected as follows : ''In cities having 
a population, as determined by the next official census 
and each official census thereafter of 50,000 and less 
than 100,000 there shall be two city judges;" in cities 
with a larg·er population 3 or 4 judges ; ''and in other 
cities having a city court there shall he one city judge .. '' 
Ogden, of course, then had one city judge. (Section 
20-4-2, U. C. A. 1943, as amended hy Chapter 35, Ses-
sion Laws of Utah, 1943.) 
Then, on June 17, 1951, the Director of the Census 
issued his final bulletin and report on the population 
of Ogden on April 1, 1950. By that report the popula-
tion was shown to be 57,112. (R 014, Exhibit B.). 
On July 31, 1951, the defendant filed with the Ogden 
City Recorder a de-claration of his candidacy for the 
office of Judge of the Ogden City Court "created by 
Chapter 26, Laws of Utah, 1951," supported by the re-
quired petition of one hundred voters. (R 002, para-
graph 7; **6; 010, paragraph 6; 014-5.) 
At about the same time several other judicial candi-
dates filed for the office of City Judge then held hy the 
incumbent. This office the Recorder designated as Judge 
·~ 
,) 
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of the First Division; the office sought by defendant 
was designated as Judge of the Second Division of the 
City Court. (R 015.) 
On August 7, 1951, no other candidate for Judge 
of the Second Division having filed within the statutory 
time limit, the defendant, pursuant to Section 1 of the 
Judicial Code as enacted by Chapter 26, Laws of 1951, 
demanded and received of the City Recorder a certifi-
cate of election to the office of Judge of the Second Divi-
sion. (R 015; 003, paragraph 10; 008; 010, paragraph 
6.) 
The Municipal Election was held on November 6, 
1951, but at that election the only judicial selection 
ballot submitted to the electors was the ballot for elec-
tion of a judge to Department No. 1 of the City Court. 
No ballot for election of a judge of Division No. 2 was 
ever submitted to the electors, and defendant's name 
was never submitted to the voters at any election or on 
any ballot. (R 019-20; 015-16.) 
On December 4, 1951, the Council of Ogden City, 
feeling that there was no need for a second judge, as 
the court seemed able to keep its work current with one 
judge, took the position that they would, as an economy 
measure, refuse to create the second job if that was 
legally possible ( R 025-6, Exhibt A), and directed a 
letter to defendant inviting him to present his point of 
VleW. (Ibid.) 
On December 27th, after hearing Mr. Patterson, 
the Council defeated a motion to strike the salary of 
-! 
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the second judge from the proposed budget, but unani-
mously passed a motion directing the institution of 
this action for a declaratory judgment to settle the legal 
problems involYed. (Ibid.) 
On December 31, 1951, the Council adopted the pro-
posed budget, '"'hich included an item of $5,000.00 as 
salary for the second judge. (R 028-9.) On the same 
day the defendant presented to the Recorder his oath 
as judge of the disputed Division No. Two, and the 
Recorder accepted and filled it. (R 029.) 
STATE~IENT OF POINTS 
1. By the terms of Section 104-4-2 of the Judicial 
Code, as amended, there is no presently existing offiee 
of city judge or ex-offieio justice of the peace of De-
partment No. Two of the Ogden City Court. 
2. Even if such office exists, the defendant is not 
legally elected or appointed to such office and has no 
right thereto. 
A. A judge of the city court is ex-officio a precinct 
justice of the peace and no one may hold such 
office except by election on secret ballot by the 
electors of the city. 
( 1) The office of justice of the peace is an elec-
tive constitutional office under Constitution of 
Utah, Article VIII, Sections 1 and 8. 
(2) Under Constitution of Utah, Article IV, 
Sections 2 and 8, the provision for election 
without secret ballot by the city electors is 
unconstitutional and void. 
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B. The office of judge of a city court is an elective 
office and the defendant, not having been elected 
thereto by secret ballot of the electors, has no 
valid claim to such office. 
C. Defendant has no valid claim to the office of 
judge of the city court as by an appointment. 
( 1) The filing of an unopposed declaration and 
petition for candidacy for such office cannot 
be deemed a valid appointment thereto, as new 
Section 1 of the Judicial Code as enacted by 
Section 2, Chapter 26, Laws of Utah, 1951, is 
void for violation of the Constitution of Utah, 
Article V, Section 1, and Article VI, Section 29. 
( 2) Such office can he filled in the first instance 
only by appointment by the Mayor with the 
consent of the City Council, and defendant 
holds no such appointment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. By the terms of Section 104-4-2 of the 
Judicial Code, as amended, there is no presently exist-
ing office of city judge or ex-officio justice of the peace 
of Department No. Two of the Ogden City Court. 
Whether or not the office claimed by defendant has 
legal existence depends upon the interpretation of the 
language the Legislature used in Section 104-4-2 of the 
Judicial Code, as amended. The key phrase, as appel-
hint sees it, is the following: 
''In cities having a population, as determined by 
the next official census and each official census 
thereafter of 50,000 and less than 100 000 there 
' 
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shall be t"To city judges; .... and in other cities 
haYing a city court there shall be one city judge.'' 
(Italics added.) 
It is submitted that under this provision Ogden 
City has only one city judge until it appears by an of-
ficial census taken subseqne,nt to May 8, 1951, (the effee-
tive date of the Act) that Ogden City has a. population 
between 50,000 and 100,000. It is not enough that by an 
official census taken prior to May 8, 1951, the city had 
a population in excess of 50,000. 
In the interpretation of this statute it must he con-
sidered that therer are at most only three possible mean-
ings of the phrase ''population as determined by ..... 
census. ' ' They are : 
1. The actual number of people living In the 
city; 
2. The actual number of people listed on the 
enumeration sheets of the census; and 
3. The official announcement by an office-r or 
employee of the Census Bureau of the count of the 
number of names listed on the census sheets. 
It is very apparent that the Legislature was not 
referring to the actual population, first, because such 
an interpretation would make the reference to the of-
ficial census meaningless, and, second, because as a prac-
tical rna tter determination of actual population is an 
almost impossible task. 
It is the city's position that the second alternative, 
namely, the number of people listed on the census enu-
7 
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meration sheets is the correct one and it is submitted 
that this position is supported by reason and the cases 
hereinafter ref erred to. 
In the court below the respondent chose the third 
alternative. However, it is submitted that this alterna-
tive does violence to the language used by the Legisla-
ture and adherence to that alternative would amount 
to judicial legislation. 
It is, of course, fundamental that in construing a 
statute an attempt must be made to arrive at the inten-
tion of the Legislature. That intention is to be derived 
from the words and language used in the light of the 
surrounding circumstances. The general rule is that the 
words used by the Legislature must be interpreted in 
their ordinary acceptation and significanee and the 
meaning commonly attributed to them. -
50 Am. Jur. ''Statutes'' 
Section 28, Note 17, Page 228 ; 
Emmertson vs. State Tax Commission 
93 Utah 219; 72 Pac. 2nd 467; 
113 A. L. R. 1174; 
Nephi Plaster and Manufacturing 
Company vs. Juab County 
33 Utah 114; 93 Pac. 53; 
14 A. L. R. (NS) 1043. 
Also, ''words in common use are to be given their 
natural, plain, ordinary and commonly understood mean-
ing." 
59 C. J. 975, Note 20; 
In re, Thompson's Estate 
72 Utah 17; 269 Pac. 103; 
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State YS. Hendrirkson 
57 lTtah 15; 24:5 Pac. 375; 
57 A. L. R. 786; 
c~arhe .... \.uto Company vs. 
Central Garage 
63 Utah 10; 221 Pac. 862; 
30 ..c-\. L. R. 1217. 
The Legislature also has spoken on this subject: 
"Words and phrases are to be construed ac-
cording to the context and the approved usage 
of the language .... " 
Section 88-2-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1943. 
(Italics added). 
What then is the meaning of the keys words used 
by the Leg-islature~ Let us consider each of them in 
its natural, plan ordinary and commonly understood 
meaning. 
First, what is a census u? 
The Federal Census is taken pursuant to the require-
ments of the Constitution of the United States. Article 
I, Section 2 provides that representatives and direct 
taxes shall be apportioned among the several states 
according to their respective "numbers" and that "The 
actual enumeration shall he made within three years 
after the first meeting of the Congress of the United 
States'' and every ten years thereafter. Article I, Sec-
tion 9 of the Federal Constitution provides that no direct 
tax shall be laid ''unless in proportion to the census or 
enumeration hereinbefor edirected to be taken.'' There 
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1s no other reference to the census and the Federal 
laws do not define a census. Apparently the drafters 
of the Constitution used the word census as the equi-
valent of the word enumeration. 
Webster's New International Dictionary, Una-
bridged, Second Edition, defines a census as : 
''An official enumeration of the population 
of a country or a city or other administrative 
district, generally with classified information 
relating to social and economic conditions.'' 
The same work defines ''enumeration'', in the sense in 
which it is obviously used in the abo~e definition, as 
"An itemized list or catalog; a census." 
The California Court in 
says that: 
City of Compton vs. Adams 
203 Pac. 2nd 7 45, 7 46, 
''A census is an official enumeration of the 
population of . . . . . a city. " 
Again in the case of 
Holcomb vs. Spike 
232 s. w. 891, 
decided by the Texas Court of Civil Appeals 1n 1921, 
it is said: 
''A census must be an official enumeration 
of the people, and as such a public record con-
taining not merely a sum total, but an official list 
of the names of a.Zl inhabitants . .. " 
10 
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And ag~ain in the rase vf 
State Ys. Wooten 
1~~ S. \\T. 1101, 1103, 
it is said that: 
4 
'.A .. census of a city is an official enumeration 
of the inhabitants with details of sex, age and 
family. It is a public document to be preserved 
in the archives of the city, rather than a mere 
su,m total of the inhabitants." (Em~hasis added). 
And in an Indiana case, 
it is said: 
City of Huntington vs. Cast 
48 ~. E. 1045, 
''A census is not merely a sum total, but an 
offici.al list containing the names of all the in-
habitants." 
Again in 
Lewis vs. Lackawanna County 
17 Pa. Super. Ct. 25, 
affirmed in 50 Atl. 162, 
the court said : 
"The census is the enumeration of the popu-
lation, 'JtOt the announ'cement of the result.'' 
This definition was quoted with approval by the Tennes-
see Supreme Court in the case of 
Underwood vs. Hickman 
39 S. W. 2nd 1034. 
It seems clear from a. reading of the Federal Sta-
tutes relating to the census that the Congress used the. 
11 
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term to refer to the enumeration and not to the bul-
letins announcing the results of the statistical survey of 
the eumeration. See for example, 
13 U. S. C. A., Section 206 
where it is said: 
''The census of the population . . . shall he 
taken as of the first day of April, and it shall be 
the duty of each enumerator to commence the 
enumeration of his district on the day following" 
The census, then, is the list of the population taken 
by the en.u.merators durmg the thirty (30) days begin-
ning April 2, 1950, and forwarded to the census super· 
visors before the end of that period. 
Next what is meant by the word "official" as used 
in referring to the census~ 
Webster's New International Dictionary, Una-
bridged, Second Edition, defines the word in the fol-
lowing terms : 
''Of or pertaining to an office, position or 
trust; connected with holding an office; as offi-
cial duties or routine. 
''Derived from the proper office or officer, 
or from proper authority; made or communi-
cated by virtue of authority; authorized; author-
itative; as, an official statement. 
''Prescribed or recognized as authorized, as, 
an official ballot.'' 
See also: 
Gunsul vs. Ray 
45 P ac. 2nd 248, 249, 
12 
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decided by the California ...:\.ppellate Court. 
It is apparent that the 'Yord "official" as used in 
the statute refers to a cellsus taken. by a public officer 
'l~tnder authority of law. It might he either a census 
taken by Federal officers or by state or city officers, 
so long it is authorized by law. 
We come then to a consideration of the word ''next'', 
which may 'vell be the crux of the matter when used as 
a modifier of the term ''census'' in the statute in ques-
tion. The word ''next'' has several meanings and the 
meaning to be ascribed to a particular use of the term 
must be ascertained from the context. Webster defines 
it as follows : 
''Near est; having nothing similar interven-
ing; as : a.. adjoining in a series ; immediately 
preceding or following in order . . . 
"b. Following that approaching (as a season), 
or in progres s (as a piece of work) ; as, I cannot 
go this Christmas, but I hope to go next (Christ-
mas)." 
The definition of the term as an adverb also sheds some 
light upon its ordinary meaning. Webster gives this 
definiton: 
'' 1. In the time, place or order nearest or im-
mediately succeeding; as, next w-e drove home ; .. 
''On the first occasion to come; as, when when 
we meet.'' 
It is apparent that in the ordinarily accepted mean-
ing of the 'vord "next," when used without some other 
qualifying term, means the next hereafter or the 
next succeeding. In ordinary conversation referring 
13 
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to events occurTing in a series the use of the word "next" 
to refer to the last preceding event is practically un-
known. When the ordinary person speaking English 
says ''next day'' he does not mean yesterday, he means 
tomorrow, unless he qualifies next by saying ''next 
preceding.'' ''Next'' used alone and without qualifiers 
in ordinary usage refers to the future and not to the 
past as indicated by the quoted definitions. 
The cases in which the problem has been considered 
in a situation like this are in accord: 
"Next" means that which comes after. 
Sandy vs. Thomas 
66 S. W. 2nd 449. 
''Next'' means subsequent. 
Osborn vs. Rogers 
19 N. J. Equity 429. 
''Next'' means nearest immediately following. 
In re Park 
8 Fed 2nd 544. 
See also the case of 
Palka vs. Walker 
124 Conn. 121, 
198 Atl. 265. 
There, under a constitutional provision giVIng the 
governor power to grant reprieves after a criminal con-
viction until the end of the ''next'' session of the Gen-
eral Assembly and no longer, it was held that the word 
''next'' did not refer to a session of the Assembly in 
existence whe~n the reprieve is granted, but referred to 
the session which begins thereafter. 
14 
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See also the case of 
State ex rel. Brunjes 
Ys. Bockelman. 
240 s. w. 209, 
hereafter more fullv discussed . •. 
If then the Legislature had intended the census of 
April 1, 1950, to be the criterion for the classification 
of cities as to the number of city court judges, it would 
normally have said : 
''As determined hy the last preceding official 
census and each official census thereafter.'' 
It did not do so. 
As will appear later in this brief, many legislatures 
have taken that natural and easy step when referring 
to a census taken prior to the effective date of the law 
and it certainly should not he presumed that the Leg-
islature turned its back upon these precedents and 
used a different word without intending a different 
meaning. 
The Legislature, if it intended the act to be immedi-
ately effective, could have said with equal ease and 
definiteness that the classification of the city should 
be ''determined by the United States Decennial Census 
for the year 1950, and by each official census there-
after." It did not do so. It chose to use the phras·e 
"next official census." It must then have intended a 
different meaning by the use of the different term. The 
Legislature knew when it sat that the census for 1950 
had been completed. The fact that Ogden City, which 
is the only city within the population range _specified, 
15 
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had a population of approximately 57,000 as determined 
by that census was a matter of common knowledge. 
Official notice thereof had been given by the preliminary 
announcements of the District Supervisor and the Direc-
tor of the Census himself issued many months before 
the Legislature convened. When it used the term 
''next'' under these circumstances it could not, it is 
submitted, have referred to anything except a census 
in which the enumeration should be taken after the 
effective date of the law on May 8, 1951. 
If the query be raised as to why the word "next" 
was used inste~d of the phrase ''United States Decennial 
Census for 1960 and each official census thereafter,'' 
the answer is obvious: There may be other official 
censuses between 1\{ay 8, 1951 and the decennial census 
of 1960. The Legislature intended that the next offi-
cial census after May 8, 1951, should establish the 
class. The Constitution of Utah itself provides for an 
official state census to be taken in 1905 and and every 
tenth year thereafter, and although such census has not 
been taken in the past it is not to be presumed that it 
'viii not be taken in 1955, especially in the light of the 
agitation for a re-apportionment of State Senators 
and Representatives. It is a general rule of law that 
public officers 'vill be presumed to perform their offi-
cial duties. 
Moreover, there may he other official censuses than 
the state and Federal Decennial censuses. See. 
City of Compton vs. Adams 
203 Pac. 2nd 7 45, 
decided by the Supreme Court of California in 1949. 
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
See also section 15-8-68, U. C.A. 1943, authorizing 
the city itself to provide for a census. 
It is submitted then that under the generally ac-
cepted meaning of the 'vords used, the phrase ''next 
official census" as used by the Legisl~.tur,e refers to 
an enumeration of the population taken by a public 
official under authority of law at a time subsequent. to 
~Iay 8, 1951. It does not and cannot refer to the report 
of the final audit of the population of Ogden issued 
on June 17, 1951. 
Such is the decision in the only case directly 1n 
point which the plaintiff has been able to find by ·a 
prolonged and diligent search. The case is 
State ex rel. Brunjes 
vs. Bockelman 
240 S. W. 209, 
decided by the 1Iissouri Court. In that case a sta-
tute passed in 1919 and approved Ma,y 27, 1919, provided 
that "on and after the first day· of January~ 1921, the 
prosecuting attorney shall receive for his· -services'' 
certain specified sums graduated according to the po-
pulation of the county in vvhich he served._. The statue 
further provided that: 
''The number of inhabitants ..... shall ... 
be ascertained by multiplying the whole number 
of votes cast at the last preeeding presidential 
election by five until after the population .· ... 
shall have been ascertained by the next decenn-ial· 
census of the United States." 
17 
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The court first held that under the· provision first above 
quoted the statute was effective and spoke as of January 
1, 1921. The 1920 census wa.s taken as of January 1, 
1920. See 
13 U. S. C. A., Sections 
21 and 42. 
The final re~sults apparently were not announced until 
after that effective date. It was argued that the words 
"next decennial census" of the United States used in 
the act of 1919 (which became effective January 1, 
1921) under these circumstances referred to the 1920 
census. The court rejected this contention, saying (Page 
212): 
''Bearing in mind that the law became effec-
tive January 1 1921, the words 'last preceding 
presidential election would mean and apply to the 
election in November, 1920 and the words 'next 
decennial census of the United States' would not 
refer to the census taken in 1920, but to the one 
to be taken in 1930. The word 'next' used in a 
law passed or becoming effective in 1921, could 
not refer to the census of 1920. As used in sta-
tutes of this character, the "\vord has the meaning 
of 'following' or 'immediately following'. Black's 
Law Dictionary, Second Ed., Page 817; State vs. 
Asbell, 57 Kan. 403; 46 Pac. 770. It at least 
could not refer to something that had gone be-
fore." 
The plaintiff respectfully submits that this case is ex-
actly in .point and should be followed here. 
While State vs. Bockelman, supra, is the only case 
the c.ity has found which is exactly in point, there are a 
number of case~ ar1s1ng under the exact converse of 
18 
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the statutory situation, that is, in cases. where· the Legis-
lature directed that official. a.ction be taken: depending 
upon population as sho""'Il by the ''last 'r. Or' ... the ' .. 'next 
preceding'' census. The reasoning use~ by .:-~he . courts 
in these cases is very helpful, for in many ~f them the 
time when official action 'Yas taken fell, as here~ between 
the ''preliminary'' announcement of census re~suits, 
and the ''final'' announcement by the J;)ire~_tor: of the 
Census. 
In these cases it was held that the ~edexal Census 
is complete and ''official'' not later th~ the day the 
Director of the Census issues a. preliminary report on 
the count of the political unit ·in question.·· By some of 
the cases it is even held that the census \vhen taken 
relates back to the date as of which· the enume:ta tion is 
made and is effective for all ·official· purPoses from 
that time. 
lTnder these decisions it is very cl~ar that_tpe 1950 
census was complete and official not later~ tha:n .August 
25, 1950 when the ])ireC~tor's ·official bulletin .. of the 
preliminary count 'vas issued. As of that date, if not 
earlier, the 1950 census b~came. officiaJ ~ ~i~!ory, nnd 
when the Legislature, in an act tal~ing.: · e~fect nine 
months later, referred to' the "next" official census it 
could not possibly refer to the '' l~st'' . o~fic~ai c·ensus 
"Thich 'vas already hi~~or:ra 'J.1hese cases t;heref ore give 
strong support to the Bockelman ease ancl . to . the po-
:. ~~~- ····'?::~··· . 
sition of the city in the case at bar. ., ·~ ! 
It is also interes~ting· to not~ that. man:'" _<)f these 
cases hold that public' ·administrati\Te official~ ~1--e bounrl 
19 
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to t,ake official notice of the population as disclosed by 
the Federal Census at least from the date of the issuance 
of a preliminary bulletin. 
-For the sake of brevity. no attempt will he made 
to discuss these cases individu,ally. They are the follow-
ing: 
Lewis vs. Lackawanna County 
17 Pa. Super. Ct. 25,. 
Affirmed 50 Atl. 162; 
Ervin vs. State 
44 S. W. 2nd 280 (Texas); 
Holcomb vs. Spiket 
232 s. w. 891; 
Garrett vs. Andersop. 
144 S. W. 2nd 971; 
Elliott vs. Sitate 
1 Pac. 2nd 370 (Oklahoma); 
Herndon vs. Excise Board 
of Garfield County 
295 Pac. 293 (Oklahoma) ; 
Board of Commissioners vs. 
Ma.the,ws 
296 Pae. 481 (Okla., 1931) ; 
Excise Board of Washita 
County vs. Lowden 
116 ·Pac. 2nd 700 (Oklahoma); 
Carter v~. Huett 
259 s. w. 1057; 
Kay vs. Moniteau County 
134 S. W. 2nd 81 (Missouri) ; 
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Under"~ood Y~. ·'Hickman 
39 S. v\ .... 2nd 1034 . (Tennessee) ; 
City of Twin Falls Ys. Koehler 
123 Pac. 2nd 715 (Idaho); 
State vs. DeHart 
131 Pac. 2nd 156 (Washington); 
State vs. Braskamp 
5± N. '':· 532 (Iowa); 
Puterbaugh vs. Wadman 
123 Pac. 804 (California); 
People YS. Wong Wang 
28 Pac. 270 (California). 
There are a number of cases dealing with the general 
subject of the effective date of a census which neither 
aid nor hamper the City's case. The respondent relied 
on some of them in the court below. However, it is 
submitted that all of them are distinguishable. In an 
effort to be of some assistance to the eourt brief con-
sideration will be given to these cases. 
The first is the :3Iissouri case of 
Varble vs. Whitecotton 
190 S. vV. 2nd 244, 
decided in 1945. There the manner of impanelling a 
petty jury depended on the population of the co,unty 
'' aceording to the last national census.'' The taking 
of the 1930 census, as of April First, vvas begun April 
Second. In June and ,July newspaper releases declared 
the results in round numbers. In ~ ovember a jury vvas 
impaneled. On Deeember T'venty-second, for the firs.t 
time, a population bulletin vvas released by the Census · 
Bureau itself. It w·as held that for the purposes ·of 
~1 
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the statute there under consideration the census was 
not in effect until December Twenty-second. It is to 
he ·observed, however, that the Varble CJase differs from 
the case before this court because. at the time the petty 
jury was there drawn, there had not even been a pre-
liminary bulletin issued by the Bureau of the Census, 
while in the case before this court at the time Chapter 
56, Laws of Utah, 1951, became effective the preliminary 
official bulletin bad been issued and promulgated many 
months previous thereto and in fact many months prior 
to the time the Legislature convened. The Varble case 
is not in point. 
Another distinguishable case is 
Wolfe vs. City of Moorhe,ad 
107 N. W. 728, 
decided by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in 1906. 
That arose under a census conducted pursuant to a 
state statute. ·Apparently Section 18 of the Aet specified 
when the census went into legal effect for the court says: 
''The census went into legal effect upon its 
compilation and publication by the superintend-
ent. 8 ection 18. '' 
(Italics supplied.) 
Of course, if. a statute provides 'vhen the census is ef-
fective, the statute must be followed. 
The case of 
Greenough vs. To,vn Council 
71 Atlantic 594, 
decided by Rhode Island in 1909 is not helpful because 
there the critical action was taken after the fina.l re-
turns of the census had been compiled and filed so that 
no question in fact arose. 
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.. A .. g-ain the case of 
Lancaster vs. o,vensboro 
- 72 S. \\T. 731 (Kentucky) 
is not in point because, as is very apparent, in th:at 
case the ordinance under which the city census, was 
taken provided that the enumeration would not be com-
plete until the Council disclosed the result and adopted 
the work of the enumerators after it had been filed with 
the Council. 
Again the case of 
Childers YS. DuYall 
63 S. vV. 8.02, 
decided by the ~'-\rkansas Court in 1901 is distinguishable. 
~Ioreover, it would appear that what the court had to 
say on the point here involved was obiter dicta.· In that 
case the eonstitution provided that until the county 
exceeded 15,000 inhabitants the circuit cle-rk should he· 
ex-officio clerk of the county and probate courts, but 
when the population exceeded that figure ''as sho'vn 
by t4e last Federal Census'' there should be . a separate 
county clerk who would be ex-officio clerk of the county 
and probate courts. In Niarch, 1900, the Democratic 
Party, anticipating a population of more than 15,000 
nomin,ated Duvall as county clerk. The 1900 census 
was taken as of June First and enume~atinn completed 
before July First. On September 3, 1900, Duvall was 
elooted county- clerlL On October 3, 1900, the (iensus 
Director published a bulletin announcing that the popu-
lation exeeeded 15,000.. On October 31, 19qD, the gover-
nor app-o1"nted Duvall to be county clerk so that it ap-;, 
pears that Duvall claimed the office both by election 
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and by ~appointment. Childers, the circuit clerk brought 
this action to tes~t Duvall's right to the offices of clerk 
of the county and probate courts. 
The Arkansas court held that Duvall properly held 
the office. It, of course, was unnecessary to decide 
whether he held the office by virtue of his election or 
by virtue of his appointment, although the court ob-
serves by way of dicta that the census was not effective 
until the dir;e0tor's bulletin, as no official notice could 
be taken of the results until then, and commented that 
in its opinion Duvall held by virtue of the appointment 
and not the election. This, however, g.eems clearly dicta 
as it is entirely unnecessary to the decision. Moreover, 
it might have been held that the election was void be-
cause the nomination election was held even before the 
census enumeration took place, and of course, the cen-
sus was not effe·ctive then. Incidentally, the cases of 
Holcomb vs. Spikes and Underwood vs. Hickm~n, supra, 
both distinguished the Childers case. 
It is submitted that none of the caS"es relied on by 
responde·nt in the court below are in point. And we 
submit that there is no judicial authority contrary to 
the position maintained by Ogden City in this case. 
It is also interes1ting to observe that on August 
1, 1950, the Attorney General of Utah officially ad-
vised the Governor of Utah that preliminary reports 
issued by the Bureau of the Census may be relied upon 
in issuing proclamations changing the classification of 
cities. Obviously the Atrtorney General was referring 
to the preliminary reports issued locally by District 
Supervisors similar to that issued with re1spect to Ogden 
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under date of June 1-!, 1930, for this 'vas some three 
and one-half 'veeks ·before the Dire~tor of the C·ensu.s 
had issued his preliminary report from Washington. 
~Ioreover, under date of December 26, 1950, the 
Attorney General of Utah rendered his official opinion 
to the State Auditor advising him that ''official actions 
based upon a Federal Decennial Census need not await 
the final 1950 population figures which will be pub-
lished early in 1951, even though not final and expressly 
subject to correction.'' Pursuant to that rule the At-
torney General advised the State Auditor that the dis-
tribution to counties, cities and towns of money available 
from the Liquor Control Fund under the provisions of 
Chapter 112, La,vs of 1947, should he made according to 
the population disclosed by the 1950 Federal ·Census. 
It is very clear that all public officials of Utah were 
taking official noti0e of the results of the 1950 census 
even before the Legislature convened and that the Legis-
lature must have understood that the 19-50 census had 
already become a matter of p·ast history. When the 
Legislature useu the phrase ''next official census'' it 
therefore must have referred to a census to be taken 
,. ,. subsequent to the already established 1950 census. 
It has been suggested that the census should not 
be held to be complete until the final announcement of 
the results of the count thereof for the reason that until 
the final verified count has been made and issued the 
results might change and s·o present an intolerable un-
certainty. Thi~ is very defin~tely not true under the 
present status of the Census Law, even though it may 
have been true during the past century. 
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By 13 U.S.C.A., Seetion 218, it is provided that: 
''The Director of the Census is authorized 
rut his discretion upon the written request of the 
governor of any state or territory of a court of 
record, to furnish such governor or court of 
record with certified copies of so much of the 
population or agriculture returns as may he re-
quesrted . . . and that the Director of the Census 
i:s further authorized, in his discretion, to furnish 
to individuals such data from the population 
schedules as may be desired for genealogical or 
other proper purposes ... and that the Director 
of ,the Census is authorized to furnish transcripts 
of table·s and other records and to prepare, special 
statistical compilations for state or local officials, 
private concerns or individuals ... '' 
Under this law at any time a£ter May 1, 1950, when 
the enumeration sheets of the census were completed 
and filed with the District Supervisor, the city recorder 
or any other interested official or person whose duties 
require a. determination of the population of Ogden 
could obtain a special preliminary count and certificate 
from the Director of the Census to guide official action. 
The fact of the population of Ogden ''as determined by 
the official eensus'' was finally and forever fixed a.s 
soon as the names were written down on the enumeration 
sheets, and there remained only ·the purely clerical job 
of counting those names. The statute 1ast quoted pro-
vides the means for settling any doubt that might exist 
as to the correctness of any preliminary .announcement. 
It is also 'vorthy of note that the Federal Statutes 
referred to in the statement of facts require the count 
to be complete not later than December 2, 1950. The 
2G 
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court, ":re think, "·ill take judicial notice that the total 
by states is reached by adding· the totals for the· various 
subdivisions and that therefore the final official report 
of the population "~as required to be eompletted for the 
various subdi\~isions before that time, 'vhich was more 
than a month before the Legislature met to draft the 
Utah la'Y in question. The Legis}ature must he presumed 
not only to ha\-e the means of knowledge, but to have the 
actual kno"-ledge of the fact that the 1950 eensus was 
complete and official, and of the results of that census 
as to the population in Ogden. 
It has also been suggested that it is unreasonable 
to suppose th~tt the Legislature- intended in 1951 to 
pass a law which would not be effective until the taking 
of the census in 1960. We submit that in the light of 
legislati\e history it is reasonable to suppose that the 
Legislature may sometimes be unreasonable. However, 
it is not necessary to suppose that the· Legislature was 
being unreasonable in making a provision in the terms 
in which it did. It has already been pointed out, first, 
that the Constitution of Utah requires a census in 1955, 
and second, that special official censuses can he eon-
ducted by the Bureau of the Census. Certainly the 
Legislature convening in 1953 could provide for a cen-
sus if it were so advised. Moreover, the City itself is 
authorized by Section 15-8-68 U.C.A. 1943, to take a cen-
sus, if it should desire to accelerate the effective date of 
the la.w. In the third place it is submitted that it would be 
even more unreasonable to suppose that the Legislature 
intended immediately to saddle Ogden City with an ex-
pensive office which i~s not needed for the administration 
of the city court. It appears from the minute-s of the 
27 
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Ogden City Council that it has found that a second judge 
in the city court is not necessary and it must be presumed 
that that finding was based upon a reasonable investi-
ga;tion. An extra and unneeded city judge for his own 
salary will cost the city $5,000 per year, to which would be 
added the necessary costs for clerks and other adminis-
trative officers and the co~st of providing and maintain-
ing the required eourt room facilities. It is submitted 
that it would be unreasonable to suppose that the 1951 
Legislature intended any such judicial feather bedding. 
It has also been suggested that Section 104-4-3 of 
the Judicial Code as amended by Chapter 26, Laws of 
Utah, 1951, has a bearing upon the problem herein-
before discussed and that by construing the two sections 
together the intention of the Legi~slature to create the 
office of a second city court judge in Ogden becomes 
clear. Tha.t is not the case. In Section 104-4-3 it is pro-
vided that: 
''Whenever it shall appear by officiul census 
that any city has attained sufficient population 
to place it within the class of cities for a city 
eourt, or to raise it to a class entitled to have an 
additional judge or judges, the mayor of such 
city, with the consent of the governing body 
there·of, shall a ppoinrt a city judge or judges ... '' 
It is submitted that t.hi~s section adds nothing to the 
one already considered. It must be observed that this 
section cannot stand alone in this regard : there is no 
provision in this section classifying the cities. The 
classific,aton of cities for purposes of determining the 
number of city court judges rests entirely upon Sec-
tion 104-4-2. It must also he observed that Section 
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10-!-4-3, by the reference to the ''class of cities,'' is 
obYiously intended to be made dependent upon the 
preceding section "'"herein the cities are classified for 
that purpose . 
... -\.s has already been demonstrated, the raising of a 
city to a class, under the provisions of the preceding 
section, does not depend upon the 1950 census but de-
pends upon some subsequent census yet to be taken. It 
is not sufficient under that seotion to show what the 
population is by the 1950 census. A population in excess 
of 50,000 "as determined by the next official census" 
to be taken hereafter is nece~ssa.ry before Ogden will 
attain that class of cities. By the terms of Section 104-
4-2 the 1950 census is excluded from those censuses 
"'"hich are to affect the classification of cities for the 
purpose involved. It follows that Section 104-4-3 has 
no influence upon the interpretation of 104-4-2; the exact 
contrary is the case, and Section 104-4-3 depends upon 
the preceding section. The reclassification of Ogden 
for the purpose of ascertaining the number of city jud-
ges cannot be effected until some census hereafter taken 
shows a population of more than 50,000 and less than 
100,000. 
The City Council of Ogden, the governing and 
policy making body of Ogden City resists the establish-
ment of the ofiice of a second city judge for re:asons of 
efficiency and economy. On reason, on the ruirect 
authority nf State vs. Bockelman, supra, and on the 
direct and indirect authority of the other cases and 
statutes hereinbefore considered, it is submitted that 
the ''next official census'' referred to by the 1951 
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Legislature refers not to the 1950 census, but to a census 
taken and enumerated at sometime subsequent to May 
8, 1951, and that, as no such eensus has yet been taken, 
there is no provision in law that Ogden City shall now 
have two city court judges. It follows that the office 
which the defendant claims to hold does not exi,st. 
POINT 2. Even if such office exists, the defendant 
is not legally elected or appointed to such office and has 
no right thereto. 
A. A judge of the city court is ex-officio a precinct 
justice of the peace and no one may hold such 
office except by election on secret ballot by the 
electors of the city. 
(1) The office of just,ice of the peace is an elective 
constitu.tional office under Constitution of 
Utah, Article VIII, Sections 1 and B. 
(2) Under Constitution of Utah, Article IV. Sec-
tions 2 and 8, the provision for election with-
out secret ballot by the city electors is un-
consti-tutional and void. 
The above matters are all part of the same propo-
sition, and it is felt they can best be considered together. 
Under the provisions of the Constitution of Utah, 
Article VIII, Sections 1 and 8, the office of justice of 
the peace is created as a constitutional elective office. 
It is a general rule followed in Utah that a.n office which 
ha.s been pr'Ovided for by the Constitution may not be 
abolished by an act of the Legislature. See 
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6·7 l---;.J.S., Page 121, 
Note 49. 
See also the annotation in 
4 A.L.R .. 205, 
supplemented by the annotation in 
172 .A .. L.R. 1366. 
See also 
Leatham YS. Reger 
54 Utah 491, 
182 Pac. 187, 
where the Utah Court says: 
''No one contends that courts created by 
the Constitution may be abrogated by Legislative 
Act.'' 
In that case the Supreme Court ruled that the city court 
act did not attempt to. abrogate the office of justice of 
the peace, but that the justice's court continued under 
the city court act with each city judge made ex-officio 
justice of the peace with power to discharge all the 
powers and dutjes pertaining to that office. The court 
commenting said : 
''There is, however, still another cogent 
reason \Vhy the foregoing construction of the ac.t 
in question should prevail. It is this: If the con-
struction conte·nded for by the defenda.nt1s be 
adopted, then it is probable that some of the pro-
visions of the act would conflict with one or more 
proyisions of the constitution.'' 
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The proVIsions of the Constitution referred to were 
Sections 1 and 8 of Article VIII by which the office of 
justice of the peace was created as a constitutional of-
fice. 
The present city court act follows that case and 
philosophy. Section 104-4-4 of the Judicial Code 
(Chapter 58, I_jaws of Utah, 1951) provides that: 
''In cities where city eourts are established 
no justice of the peace shall he elected or ap-
pointed, and the judge or judges of the city court 
shall be ex-officio justices of the peace for the pre-
cinct, and as such shall p·erform the duties of such 
office.'' (ItaliG·S added) 
It must be observed that under this statute a city 
judge is also, by virtue of his office, justice of the peace 
for the precinct. There are two offices, but the Legis-
lature has made it abundantly clear that a city judge 
must also he, and qualify as a Justice of the Peace. This 
was obviously done to insure the continuation of the 
eonstitutional office of justice of the precinct, as the 
Legislature recognized then than an attempt to abolish 
that office would render the act void. Respondent can-
not claim to he elected city judge without being also 
elected justice of the peace. The first carries with it 
the other. This being the case, the manner of election 
to the first must conform to constitutional requirements 
for election to the second. 
In the case of 
Love vs. Liddle 
26 Utah 62, 
72 Pac. 185, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the court held that justices of the peaee of a eity pre-
cinct are precinct offieers and that they are one distinct 
class of judicial officer established by the constitution. 
It· must again be emphasized that. clearly under the 
Constitution the justices of the peace are established 
as elective officers and are so refe-rred to in Article· 
VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution where: it is. said that 
the Legislature may determine how many justices of 
the peace may be elected. All of the statutes relating 
to justices of the peace provide for their eleetion. The 
city court act, until the enactment of Chapter 26, 
Laws of Utah, 1951, specifically provided that the city 
judges and ex-officio justices of the peace should be 
elected. 
However, by that last piece of legislation the Leg-
islature provided that if ony one candidate filed for 
office, he should ''forthwith'' be issued a certificate 
of election for the ensuing term. It is under this pro-
vision that the defendant claims to have been elected to 
the office of eity court judge and ex-officio justice of 
the peaee, if such offiee exists. It is to be noted that 
the defendant does not claim under any of the provisions 
of the law authorizing interim appointme·nts, but only 
as an elected official. 
It is submitted that the provisio of the law refer-
red to is void and unconstitutional because it i·s con-
trary to the provisions of Article IV, Seetion 2 and 
8 by which it is provided that every qualified citizen 
s.hall be entitled to vote· by secret ballot at every election. 
~3 i.J 
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Defendant does not contend that anyone cast any secret 
ballot for him or that his name was submitted to the 
voters upon any official ballot for vote. 
Moreover, it must be observed that the law nort only 
requires that the name of a candate be submitted to 
the voter~s upon a s.ecret ballot, but that a blank ticket 
be provided wherein the voters may write in the name 
of any candidate of their choice even though he has not 
been nominated and his name printed on the ballot. See 
Sections 25-11-1 as amended and Sections 25-11-3 and 25-
6-5, as amended, Utah Code Annotated, 1943. See also 
the case of 
Park vs. Rives 
40 Utah 47, 
119 Pac. 1034, 
in which Utah's non-parti~san ballot in municipal elec-
tions was attacked upon the ground that in failing to pro-
vide for a blank ticket for writing in a candidate of a 
voter's choice 1t violated the provisions of Article IV, 
Section 2 and 8 of the Constitution of Utah because 
it impaired the franchise guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion. The court said : 
"Let it he conceded that, if the act ~so restricts 
and probih1ts a voter (restricts him to vote for 
one or two candidia.tes named on the ballot and 
prohibjts a write-in of another choice), such leg-
islation would, as. is urged, be an improper in-
terference with the elective franchise. 15 Cyc. 
289." 
The court then held that in order to bring the act into 
harmony with the Constitution the provisions of the 
34 
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general election la"·, incorporated by reference in the 
act providing for non-partisan municipal ballots, would 
apply. The g·eneral la,y· requires that the ballot contain 
a blank ticket ''"here any voter may vote for any person 
of his choice whether or not he was nominated at the 
primary. 
See also 
18 Am. J ur. ''Elections'', 
Section 191, Page 307, 
Note 9, 
,,~here it is said: 
'• The majority view, however, seems to he that 
a statute prohibiting the writing in of names of 
candidate's upon the ballot is unconstitutional.'' 
See also the a1motations in 
A1motated Cases, 1913D 614 
and 
91 American State Reports 682. 
The annotation last cited contains an excellent editorial 
analysis of the cases decided up to that time and of the. 
reasoning behind the majority rule. It is re1spectfully 
recommende·d for the court's especial attention. 
It is interesting to note that very few cases seem 
to have been decided on this point during the last twenty 
or thirty year8. Apparently most legiStlatures, sensi-
tive to the sacredne·ss of the franchise, have regarded 
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the matter a.s settled and have not attempted to dis-
enfranchise the citizens as to an elective office as the 
Legislwture of Utah, apparently without sufficient con-
sideration, attempted to do in the last quoted provision 
of the City Court Judicial Selection Bill. 
It is common· knowledge that electors not infre-
quently elect write-in candidates. The write-in fran-
chise and privilege is a very real and important one 
in our :borm of government. The Eisenhower vote in . 
the recent Republican primaries illustrates the possi-
bilities. 
It has been suggested that this court's decision in 
Rich vs. Industrial Commission 
80 U ta.h 511 ; 15 Pac. 2nd 641, 
by implication holds that nowtwithstanding the city 
eourt statute providing that the city judge is ex-officio 
justice of the peace, they are separable and rthat the res-
pondent lawfully holds the office of city judge even 
though he is not legally elected as a justice of the peace. 
It is submitted that this is not the case. The decision 
referred to was made under a special statute relating to 
the duties of constable in the city precinct and was con-
cerned only with the problem of whether the constable or 
the sheriff was the officer required by law to serve pro-
cess from the city court. It was held that under the pecul-
iar statute in question (Section 19-22-1, Utah Code An-
notated, 1943) the constable was required to serve pro-
cess from justice's courts but only permitted, though 
not required, to serve process from city courts. This, 
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of course~ has nothing to do \Yith 'Whether or not the pre-
siding offices in the t"'"o courts are merg·ed in one man as 
above outlined. The ease is not in point. Neither is there 
any analogy to be dra"11 therefrom. 
It seems very clear from the authorities mentioned 
that the provision of the statute under which the defend-
ant claims the offiee of judge of the Second Department 
of the Ogden City Court and ex-officio justice of the· 
peace for Ogden Precinct is uncontitutional and void 
and defendant eannot claim or acquire any rights what-
soever thereunder. The provision that a cadidate shall 
be elected to an elective office hy the mere process of 
filing his uncontested candidacy and without ever hav-
ing been submitted to the voters upon a secret ballot 
with provision for a write-in opp.osition candidate, is 
unconstitutional and void. Out of that void statute no 
rights can accrue to the defendant and he cannot claim 
election to the office if it exists, by virtue of an unconsti-
tutional procedure. Even if the office exists, the de-
fendant is not legally elected thereto and should not he 
permitted to attempt to discharge the power and duties 
incident to the office. The judgment and declaration 
of the court should be entered accordingly. 
B. The office of judge of a city court is an elective 
office and the defendant, not ha.ving been elected 
thereto by secret ballot of the electors, has no 
valid claim to S'UC'h office. 
This argument needs little elaboration. By Section 
104-4-2 of the Judicial Code, as amended, it is provided 
that city judges ''shall be elected by the qualified elec-
tors of their respee;tive ·cities.'' This, of course, 1s 111 
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accordanc.e with practice and tradition in a free republic 
and eonfirms to constitutional requirements. The pro-
vision that an unopposed cadida.te shall be issued a cer-
tific.ate of election without being placed on the ballot, 
is, of course, diametrically opposed to the provision 
quoted. It is not possible to reconcile them. One or the 
other must fall. 
Under these circumstanees the one which violrutes 
the constitution and the tradition of government should 
and must give away, and it should he held that no one 
ma.y be ''elected'' to the office of city judge, except by 
the eleetors in the secret ballot at a r·egularly called 
free elecrtion. 
The case of Park vs. Rives, supra, points the way. 
As there it was held that a blank space must be provided 
on the ballot, even though not required hy the parti-
cular statute, so here it should be held that even an un-
opposed condidate must be submitted to the voters on a 
secret ballot with a blank ticket provided for ''write-
in" candidates. 
As the respondent here was not elected by the elec-
tors by any ballot, he is not legally elected and has no 
right to the offic.e of Judge of Department No. Two of 
the Ogden City Court, if that office does exist. 
C. Defendant has no valid cla.im to the office of 
judge of the city court as by an appoi,ntment. 
(1) The filing of an unopposed declaration and 
petition for candidacy for such office cannot 
be deemed a valid appointm.ent thereto, as new 
Section 1 of the Judicial Code as enacted by 
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Section ~' Chapter ~G, Laws of Utah, 1951, is 
voi.d for V'iolation of the Constitution of Utah, 
Article lr, Section 1, and Article VI, Section 29. 
It 'Yas suggested in the court below tha1t as the 
office of judg·e of a. city court is one ereated by the Leg-
islature, the Legislature has power to provide for the 
appointment of the city judge hy any method it deems 
proper, and that the provision of the statute for the 
issuance of a certificate of election when it is made to 
appear that a candidate is unopposed, is the legal equi-
v~lent of an appointment by the candidate and his one 
hundred supporting petitioners and the city reeorde·r. 
There are two reasons why this eannot be the ease. 
First, as hereinbefore demonstrated, the office of 
city judg·e carries with it ex-officio the offiee of justice 
of the peace which is an elective constitutional office 
not subject to appointment in this manner. 
Second, the Legislature under our Utah Constitu-
tion has no authority to authorize an unoffieial private 
association of citizens to a publiic municipal offiee. Any 
statue which attempts to grant s-q.ch a right and priv-
ilege is unconstitutional and void for violation of 
Article V, Section 1 and Article VI, Section 29 of the 
Constitution of Utah. 
The first section of the Constitution referred to vests 
all of the powers of government of the State of Utah 
in three departments, the Legislative, the Eocecutive and 
the Judicial. No exceptions are made. The p·eople by 
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their Constitution have delegated all powers of govern ... 
ment to the state and the Legislature may not re-delegate 
any gove-rnmental function to any p·rivate person or 
association of persons. 
The whole theory of the Republican form of govern ... 
ment, which is guaranteed to the State of Utah by the 
Federal Constitution, is that government powers shall 
he exer:eis.ed only by publie officers duly selected to re-
present the sovereign people. "While it is recognized 
that public offices can be created and filled by appoint-
ment, it is fundamental that no per~son may exercise 
the sovereign power of filling a public office except by 
election by secret ballot as provided in the Constitution, 
or through appointment hy a public officer or public body 
to whom the people have delegated that official power 
and authority. The public officers may not redelegate 
that sovereign power to any private person or associa-
tion of persons. To permit them so to do would be to 
authorize them entjrely to abrogate their own func-
tions and duties and to appoint a dictator for the state. 
This they cannot do. 
The Constitution of Utah is specific on this point 
as regards municipal functions. Section 29 of Article 
VI provides that ''the Legislature shall not delegate-
to any special commission, private eorporation or asso-
ciation, any power .... to perform any municipal func-
tions.'' It is obvious thrut the selection of a city judge 
to administer a city c.ourt having exclusive jurisdic-
tion of criminal actions under city ordinances and who 
is a city officer paid out of the city tre·asury is a muni-
cipal funetion. It is equally obvious that the Legis-
40 
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lature eannot delegate this function to any self-appointed 
"private assoriation" of one hundred electors, respon-
sible to no one but to themselves and a~ssociated on their 
own motion only for the purpose of selecting a judge. 
This is exactly "That the statute in question attempts 
to do. It clearly violates the expre~ss prohibition of the 
Constitution and is void. 
If it should be argued that it is the city recorder 
who issues the certificate of ''election,'' and that the 
city recorder is a p11blic officer, it need only be observed 
by way of answer that the city recorder under the sta-
tute has no discretion but is required by the statute as 
a ministerial act to issue the certificate if the candidate 
is unopposed. Thus the act is not the recorde-r's but 
is the act of the candidate and his one hundred peti-
tioners. That argument can avail the respondent no-
thing. 
This conclusion is supported by well reasoned cases 
from other jurisdictions and by a decision of the Su-
preme Court of Utah. 
In the case of 
Tucker vs. State (Indiana, 1941) 
35 N. E. 2nd 270, 301, et seq., 
it was held that while the legislature might create new 
offices and provide for the selection of officers to oper-
ate them, it has no power or discretion to vest a part of 
the sovereign power in some agency outside the govern-
ment as set up and established by the Constitution, and 
that power of appointment to public office is a sovereign 
power which cannot he dele~g--ated to any private agency. 
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Indeed the Indiana eourt indicated that under the con-
stitutional division of power the legislature could not ap-
point an offieer to an exeeutive or judicial position and 
that exeept as expressly authorized by the Constitution 
the executive could not be authorized to appoint to a 
judicial or legislative position, etc. However, it is not 
necesssary to go this far to sustain the position of Ogden 
City in this case. 
And in the case of 
State vs. Schorr (Delaware, 1948) 
65 Atl. 2nd 810, 
it appeared that the legislature had created a county 
department of elections, and provided that five mem-
bers should be nominated by the chairman of each of 
the two leading political parties. These parties were 
held not to be state agencies or connected with the state 
government, but were only voluntary associations of 
individuals. The statute further made it mandatory 
that the governor appoint the nominees of the respective 
political parties. This provision the court very pro-
perly considered to be a vesting of the power of appoint-
ment in the. party chairman. The governor's position 
there was exartly that of the c1ity recorder in the case 
at bar. 
The Delaware Court held that: 
''. . . . the legislature cannot delegate to the 
State Chairman of a political party, which is a 
voluntary organization of individuals, account-
able to no one except its own organization, hav-
ing no connection with the three branches of gov-
ernment in which the sovereign power of Govern-
ment is lodged by the Constitution, the power to 
42 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
appoint the members of a. state agency ... Rice 
v. Foster, -! Hav. -!79; Rouse Y. Thompson, 228 
Ill. 52~, 81 N. E. 1109; People ex rei. Shumway 
vs. Benn2.tt, 29 ~Iich. 4:51, 18 Am. Rep. 107; State 
ex inf. Hadley v. \Vashbury, 167 Mo. 680, 67 S. W. 
592, 90 Am. St. Rep·. 430; Ohio & M. Ry. Co. v. 
Todd, 91 Ky. 175, 15 S. W. 56; Winters v. Hughes, 
3 Utah 443, 24 P. 759." 
This case seems to be exactly in point. 
Then the lT tah case of 
\\~inters vs. Hughes 
3 Utah 443, 
24 Pac. 759, 
although not exactly in point, is exactly analogous. The 
problem involved in that case develop·ed when the Leg-
islature passed an act directing that on p·etition of one 
hundred voters in any judicial district, the judge should 
hold a special session of court at the time and place 
specified in the petition. This court held that the leg-
islative act was void as an attempted, unlawful dele-
gation of governmental legislative power conferred by 
the organic act on the legislature and the governor, 
which provided that courts should be held at times and 
places "prescribed by law." This court there pointed 
out that if the power to delegate to any one hundred 
petitioning citizens the authority to determine where 
and when sessions of court are to be held, a single indiv-
idual may equally be vested with such power by legis-
lative act, ''and the strange spectacle would be presented 
of courts, officers and suitors becoming subject to the 
caprice of one man. '' In other words if any sovereign 
governmental function can be delegated to a private in-
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dividual or association, then all such governmental func-
tions can be so delegated, and our Republican form Gov-
eTnment could be swallowed up by a dictatorship. This 
certainly is eontrary to our theory of government as set 
up in our Constitution. The very idea is repugnant 
to Americans and violative of the clear intent and express 
provisions of the Constitution of Utah. 
It is submitted that the respondent here cannot val-
idly claim the office of city judge as by an appointment 
through the procedure followed. 
(2) Such r,ffice can be filled in the first instance 
only by appointment by the Ma.yor with the con-
sent of the City Council, and defendant holds no 
such appointment. 
Even if it were to be conceded that the office of 
judge of a. city court can be filled by appointment, the 
appointing po,ver is by the terms of the statute itself 
vested exclusively in the Mayor of the city acting with 
the consent of the governing body. 
By Section 1 04-4-3 of the Judicial Code as amended 
hy Chapter 26, Laws of Utah, 1951, when a city has 
entered a class entitled to have an additional judge, the 
Mayor is authorized to appoint one. 
On the other hand the new Section 1 of the Judicial 
Code as enacted by said Chapter 26 provides for the 
nomination and ''election'' of a judge of a city court 
only '' al the expiration of the term of a judge of a city 
court." (Italics supplied). In such event the judicial 
candidate may fill his declaration of candidacy with a 
supporting petition of qualified voters. No provision 
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is made for the election of a judge exeept to fill the va-
cancy ereated by the expiration of the term of one 
already in office. 
It is obvious from a reading of the various pro-
Yisions of the statutes in pari materia, as required by 
the rules of construction, that the Legislature intended 
that a ne"\v office of ei ty judge should be filled in the 
first instance only by appointment by the Mayor. At 
the termination of his term he would be the incumbent 
retiring, and both he and other candidates could then 
aspire to election for the second and succeeding te·rms 
of the new office. 
It is also interesting to note from the title of Chap-
ter 26 as well as from the body of the statute that it is 
intended thereby to provide a non-partisan method of 
selecting judges of the city courts. We think the court 
will take judicial notice of the history of the movement 
for non-partisan selection of the judiciary. It is to he 
recalled that the Legislature first proposed a consti-
tutional amendment to the se-ctions of the Constitution 
which required the elec.tion of Supreme Court Justices 
and Judges of the District Courts-but made no such 
proposal as to the se-ction referring to the election of 
Justices of the Peace. The people ratified this proposal 
and the legislatures for the past several sessions have 
been concerned with the implementation of the consti-
tutional amendmets. Chapter 26 apparently was pri-
marily concerned with bringing the eity eourt into har-
mony with the legislation adopted at the same session 
for district and su·preme court justiees. 
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The philosophy of the· act as disclosed by the pro-
vision that incumbents shall have a definite advantage 
is to obtain and retain in the judiciary judges of ade-
quate training and experience. Other acts passed by 
previous legislatures but vetoed by the governor pro-
vided for appointment of distriet and supreme court 
justices in a·ccordance with the new philosophy as to 
judicial selection. Apparently the Legislature consi-
dered that responsible· public officers would be more 
likely to select a man who was good judicial timber than 
would the general population in an election where par-
tisan politics and the "vote getting" personalities of 
the several candidates would obscure the real issue 
of judicial qualification, 
Considering the words used and the purpose of 
establishing an improved non-partisan method for se-
lecting the judiciary, it seems clear that the Legislature 
intended the fj rs.t incumbent in office should be ap-
pointed by the Mayor. If the office in question exists, 
the current term is the first term thereof so that the 
only way defendant eould lawfully claim that office 
would be by appointment from the Mayor. He makes 
no elaim to such appointment. He has no right to the 
office even under the terms of the statute under which 
he claims. 
GENERAL OBSERVATION ON THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST 
Perhaps it is not improper in the light of the public 
interest involved to observe that the decision here sought 
by Ogden City \vill not cause difficulty or confusion in 
the city courts of other cities in the state. The number 
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of judges serYing in other city c.ourts \vas not changed 
by the amendment to the statute so that there is no ques-
tion in other cities as to the number of judges. As to 
the election procedure, it appears that all other judges 
of city courts "\Yho receive certificates of eleetion with-
out being voted upon were the incumbents during a 
previous term, so that if their present certificates of 
election are invalid for the reasons herein discussed, 
nevertheless ~he judges in question lawfully continue 
to hold their repective offices beeause their respective 
successors have not yet been elected and qualified. 
CONCLUSION 
Upon the facts and authorities hereinbefore dis-
cussed it is respectfully submitted, first, that the office 
to which respondent aspires does not exist in law, and 
secondly, that even if such office exists, the defendant 
has not been legally elected or appointed thereto. ·The 
judgment of the lower court should be reversed and 
the lower court should be directed to enter judgment 
in favor of appellant as prayed in its complaint. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PAUL THATCHE:R 
Corporation Counsel of 
·Ogden City 
Attorney for Appellant 
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